

# Formalization of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics

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- The First Welfare Theorem
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# Section 1

## Economics


# Where are we?

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


**Mathematics**


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


# Where are we?





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# Economy vs Market

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## Economy

- more general notion of a game.
- “Set of Markets”
- Market Economy, Planned Economy, Command Economy, etc.

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## Market

- “A place for transaction”
- “Rules of transaction”
- Competitive markets, duopoly, monopoly, etc.

# The Agent

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## Consumption sets

- “Set of Goods and Services”
- represented as vectors:  $(1, 0, 12, \pi, 0, \dots, 5)$
- $n$  goods represented by an  $n$ -dimensional euclidean space

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## Comparison

- Preference (relation)
- Utility function

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## Comparison

- Preference (relation)
- **Utility function**

## Definition (Utility function)

Given a preference relation  $\succeq$ , a utility function  $u$ , is defined:

$$u : X^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}$$
$$\forall x y . x \succeq y \iff u(x) \geq u(y).$$



$(1 \text{ apple}, 1 \text{ orange}) \succ (0, 0);$

$(1 \text{ apple}, 1 \text{ orange}) \succ (0, 0); (1, 0) \succ (0, 1);$


$u(1, 1) > u(0, 0); u(1, 0) > u(0, 1);$

$(1 \text{ apple, } 1 \text{ orange}) \succ (0, 0); (1, 0) \succ (0, 1); (10, 5) \approx (9, 10)$

$u(1, 1) > u(0, 0); u(1, 0) > u(0, 1); u(10, 5) = u(9, 10)$

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# Pareto Efficiency & Walrasian Equilibrium

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## Definition (Pareto Efficiency)


Pareto efficiency is said to occur when it is impossible to make one agent better off without making another worse off.

## Edgeworth Box


- Pure exchange Market Model
- 2 consumers
- 2 goods
- Visual Interpretation




# Edgeworth Box Economy




## Edgeworth Box Economy




## Edgeworth Box Economy




## Edgeworth Box Economy




## Edgeworth Box Economy




## Edgeworth Box Economy



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## Edgeworth Box Economy





# Section 2

## Formalization

# Utility and Preference

## Preference relation

**locale** preference =

**fixes** carrier :: "'a set"

**fixes** relation :: "'a relation"

**assumes** not\_outside: " $(x,y) \in \text{relation} \implies x \in \text{carrier}$ "

**and** " $(x,y) \in \text{relation} \implies y \in \text{carrier}$ "

**assumes** trans\_refl: "preorder\_on carrier relation"

## Rational preference relation

**locale** rational\_preference = preference +

**assumes** "total\_on carrier relation"

# Utility and Preference cont.

## Utility function

```

locale ordinal_utility =
  fixes carrier :: "'a set"
  fixes relation :: "'a relation"
  fixes u :: "'a  $\Rightarrow$  real"
  assumes "x  $\in$  carrier  $\Longrightarrow$  y  $\in$  carrier  $\Longrightarrow$ 
    x  $\succeq$ [relation] y  $\longleftrightarrow$  u x  $\geq$  u y"
  assumes "x  $\succeq$ [relation] y  $\Longrightarrow$  x  $\in$  carrier"
  and "x  $\succeq$ [relation] y  $\Longrightarrow$  y  $\in$  carrier"

```

# Local non-satiation and Pareto ordering

## Local non-satiation

**definition** local\_nonsatiation **where**

"local\_nonsatiation B P  $\longleftrightarrow$  ( $\forall x \in B. \forall e > 0. \exists y \in B.$   
norm (y - x)  $\leq$  e  $\wedge$  y  $\succ$ [P] x)"

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 $\text{norm } (y - x) \leq e \wedge y \succ [P] x$ )"

## Pareto ordering

**definition** pareto\_dominating **where**

"X  $\succ$  Pareto Y  $\longleftrightarrow$   
 $(\forall i \in \text{agents}. U[i] (X\ i) \geq U[i] (Y\ i)) \wedge$   
 $(\exists i \in \text{agents}. U[i] (X\ i) > U[i] (Y\ i))$ "

# Section 3

## Models

# Exchange economy

```

locale exchange_economy =
  fixes consumption_set :: "('a::ordered_euclidean_space) set"
  fixes agents :: "'i set"
  fixes  $\mathcal{E}$  :: "'i  $\Rightarrow$  'a"
  fixes Pref :: "'i  $\Rightarrow$  'a relation"
  fixes U :: "'i  $\Rightarrow$  'a  $\Rightarrow$  real"
  fixes Price :: "'a"
  assumes "Price > 0"
  assumes "i  $\in$  agents  $\implies$ 
    eucl_ordinal_utility consumption_set (Pref i) (U i)"
  assumes "finite agents" and "agents  $\neq$  {}"

```

# Exchange economy

...

**fixes** firms :: "'f set"

**fixes**  $\Theta$  :: "'i  $\Rightarrow$  'f  $\Rightarrow$  nat" (" $\Theta$ [\_,\_]")

**assumes** "i  $\in$  agents  $\Rightarrow$

eucl\_ordinal\_utility consumption\_set Pr[i] U[i]"

**and** "pre\_arrow\_debreu\_consumption\_set consumption\_set"

**assumes** "j  $\in$  firms  $\Rightarrow$  ( $\sum_{i \in \text{agents}} \Theta[i,j]$ ) = 1"

**assumes** "Price > 0"

**assumes** "finite agents" **and** "agents  $\neq$  {}"



# Competitive Equilibria

**definition** competitive\_equilibrium

**where**

"competitive\_equilibrium P X Y  $\longleftrightarrow$  feasible X Y  $\wedge$   
 $(\forall j \in \text{firms. } (Y j) \in \text{profit\_maximisation } (\text{production\_sets } j)) \wedge$   
 $(\forall i \in \text{agents. } (X i) \in \text{arg\_max\_set } U[i]$   
 $(\text{budget\_constraint } (\text{poe\_wealth } i Y)))$ "

**definition** budget\_constraint

**where**

"budget\_constraint W =  
 $\{x \in \text{consumption\_set. Price} \cdot x \leq W\}$ "

## Section 4

# The First Welfare Theorem

# Some History

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*It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.*

— Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations* (1776)

*By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.*

— Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations* (1776)

# First Welfare Theorem

## Theorem (First Theorem of Welfare Economics)

*Assuming locally non-satiated preferences for each agent, any allocation in combination with a price vector that forms a Walrasian Equilibrium is Pareto Efficient.*

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**theorem** first\_welfare\_theorem\_exchange:

**assumes** " $\bigwedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies$

local\_nonsatiation consumption\_set Pr[i]"

**assumes** "comp\_equilib\_endow Price  $\mathcal{X}$   $\mathcal{E}$ "

**shows** "pareto\_optimal\_endow  $\mathcal{X}$   $\mathcal{E}$ "

# Future Work and Misc.

- Second Welfare Theorem
- more (economic) models
- formalizing more Game Theory: Algorithmic Game theory, Mechanisms, . . .

[https://www.isa-afp.org/entries/First\\_Welfare\\_Theorem.html](https://www.isa-afp.org/entries/First_Welfare_Theorem.html)

*Questions?*



## Ordinal Utility

```
lemma ordinality_of_utility_function :  
  fixes f :: "real  $\Rightarrow$  real"  
  assumes monot: "monotone (op>) (op>) f"  
  shows "(f  $\circ$  u) x > (f  $\circ$  u) y  $\longleftrightarrow$  u x > u y"
```

## Finite Carrier

```
theorem fnt_carrier_exists_util_fun:  
  assumes "finite carrier"  
  assumes "rational_preference carrier relation"  
  shows " $\exists$  u. ordinal_utility carrier relation u"
```

## Walras' Law

```
lemma walras_law:  
  assumes " $\bigwedge i. i \in \text{agents} \implies \text{local\_nonsatiation}$   
   $\text{consumption\_set } Pr[i]$ "  
  assumes " $\text{competitive\_equilibrium } Price\ X\ Y$ "  
  shows " $Price \cdot ((\sum_{i \in \text{agents}} (X\ i)) -$   
   $(\sum_{i \in \text{agents}} \mathcal{E}[i]) - (\sum_{j \in \text{firms}} Y\ j)) = 0$ "
```

# Walras' Law

